We analyze the interaction between bank and market nance in a model where bankers gather information through monitoring and screening. We show that, if a market is established characterized by a disclosure law such that entrepreneurs wishing to raise market nance can credibly disclose their sources of nancing, this might undermine bankers' incentive to screen, even when screening is ecient. Correspondingly, other things being equal, the change from a bank-based system to one in which market-nance and bank-nance coexist might have an adverse aect on economic growth. Consistent with this result, our empirical ndings suggest that, although both bank and stock market development have a positive eect on growth, the growth impact of bank development is reduced by the development of the stock market.
1 Introduction he lrge ody of literture on nne nd growth oers severl explntions s to why nnil institutions filitte eonomi growthF I pinnil institutions moilize svingsD diversify risk nd produe informtion out investment opportunitiesF hese funtions help to improve the produtivity of nned investmentsD whih should result in higher growth rtes provided tht the returns to umulle inputs re nonEdiminishing t n ggregte levelF gonsistent with this theoretil propositionD severl empiril studies nd tht nnil development n e strongly relted to the proess of eonomi growthD lthough the strength nd the sign of suh reltionship might vry with the level of eonomi development nd other ountryEspei ftorsF P en importnt spet of the reltionship etween nne nd growth is the wy in whih the nnil strutureD proxied y the importne of nnil institutions suh s nks reltive to nnil mrketsD ets the llotion of nnil resouresF gruilly relevnt to this issue is the oservtion tht when mrkets re inompleteD nnil institutions nd pitl mrkets might et eh other in non trivil wyF por instneD ellen nd qle @IWWUA demonstrte tht while nks n provide more eetive intertemporl risk smoothing thn nnil mrketsD their eetiveness in performing this role ruilly depends on the degree of ompetition from the mrketsF trong ompetition might result in disintermeditionD undermining nks9 ility to provide intertemporl risk smoothingF sn this pperD we study the intertion etween nnil investors tht gther inE formtion out investment opportunities nd nnil mrket where informtion is dislosedD nd derive the onsequenes for the llotion of nnil resouresF e nd tht the estlishment of nnil mrket hrterized y dislosure lw suh tht entrepreneurs wishing to rise nne n redily dislose their soures of nningD my undermine institutions9 inentives to sreen the qulity of the investments they nneF his might our even if sreening would hve een eientF epplying this result in the ontext of growth modelD we show thtD other things eing equlD the hnge in the nnil struture resulting from the introdution of suh dislosure lw ould et the equilirium growth rte of the eonomy in n dverse wyF e onstrut simple model of ompetitive nnil system in whih nnil investors provide funds to entrepreneursF pinnil investors n monitor @nd sreenA the entrepreneurs they fundD in whih se we ll them nkersF elterntivelyD they n purhse nnil seuritiesD in whih se we ll them mrket investorsF intrepreneurs n either rely on nkers to nne their investments @nkEnneA or issue nnil seurities in the mrket @mrketEnneAD or othF 1 eminl ontriutions inlude qreenwood nd tovnovi @IWWHAD intEul @IWWPAD feniveng nd mith @IWWIAF gno @IWWQA nd vevine @IWWUA survey this litertureF 2 ee uing nd vevine @IWWQA for n erly ontriutionF xon liner studies inlude ghristopoulos nd sions @PHHRAD heidd nd pttouh @PHHPA nd rrris @IWWUAF P e rst present set up in whih the min soure of imperfet informtion is tht entrepreneurs9 investment deisions re privteD iFeF non oservle y third prtiesF his gives rise to morl hzrd prolem sine y ssumption entrepreneurs hve the inentive to hoose negtive net present vlue @xA investmentsF eordinglyD there is sope for nkers to monitorD whih would eliminte the morl hzrd issueF wonitoring is ostlyD nonverile nd nonoservleF husD similr to the model y rolmstrom nd irole @IWWUAD nkers need to e given the inentive to monitorF feuse of monitoring ostsD nkEnne is lwys more expensive thn mrketEnneD nd thus entrepreneurs im t minimizing its useF yn the other hndD nnil investors re willing to supply mrketE nne only if they know tht the entrepreneurs re eing monitoredF ine monitoring osts re xedD nker hs the inentive to monitor n entrepreneur if nd only if the mount of nne supplied y the nker to tht entrepreneur does not fll elow ertin minimumF hereforeD the mount of nkEnne rised y n entrepreneur is informtive of whether tht entrepreneur will e monitoredF sf the nnil mrket enfores dislosure lwD entrepreneurs n redily dislose their soures of nningD so tht they hve ess to mrketEnneF sn this seD entrepreneurs9 equilirium pitl struture is mixture of mrketEnne nd nkEnneD where the ltter is kept t minimumF ytherwiseD without dislosure lwD entrepreneurs nnot redily dislose their soures of nning nd mrketEinvestors re not informed on whether entrepreneurs re monitored or notD so tht nk nne is the only soure of nneF sn this simple modelD the intertion etween nkEnne nd mrketEnne is irrelE evntX the x of nned investment does not depend on whether the nnil system omprises oth mrket nd nk nne or only the ltterF e dierent onlusion is rehed when the following dditionl ssumptions re inE troduedX F here exist two qulities of investment yielding positive xD with the etter qulity eing ssoited with higher expeted xY F he qulity of investments is oservle only y inurring xed sreening ostF Q imilrly to monitoringD nker hs the inentive to sreen the qulity of n entrepreneur9s projets if nd only if the E nne supplied y the nker to tht entrepreneur is enough to reover the xed sreening ostsD given the expeted gin due to the seletion of high qulity investments through the sreeningF hereforeD the mount of nkEnne rised y n entrepreneur is not just informtive of whether tht entrepreneur will e monitored or notD ut lso of whether her investments hve een sujet to sreening or notF tillD if there is no dislosure lwD entrepreneurs nnot redily dislose their soures of nning to mrket investorsF hereforeD nkEnne will e the only soure of nningF nder these irumstnesD nkers internlize ll the enets from sreening nd therefore provide the eient level of sreeningF hierentlyD when the dislosure lw is in pleD mrket investors eome informed nd the entrepreneurs n minimize the use of nkEnne y gining ess to 3 wnoveD dill nd gno @PHHIA onsider model in whih nks either just monitor orrowers or lso sreen pplintsF Q mrketEnneF his might led to n equilirium in whih the demnd for nkEnne is so low tht no sreening tkes pleD even when sreening would e eientF xot ll enets from the sreening proess re internlized y nkers who inur the ostF fy dislosing their soures of nningD entrepreneurs indiretly revel the qulity of their investment nd s resultD mrket investors pture prt of the enets from sreening without inurring ny ostF his explins why n ineient level of sreening n ourF e nd thtD given the sreening ostD for intermedite levels of the return to investE mentD either only pooling equilirium exists with no sreeningD irrespetive of whether sreening would hve een eient or notD or the pooling equilirium oexists with the sreening equiliriumF ynly if the return on the est qulity projets is suiently highD the equilirium is lwys hrterized y the eient level of sreeningF hese onlusions re inorported in simple overlpping genertion model to show thtD other things equlD the hnge from system in whih nkEnne is the only soure of nning to system hrterized y the intertion etween nk nd mrket nne ould hve negtive eet on eonomi growthF his theoretil result hs importnt implitions for the nnil struture nd growth9 dete @see holr nd weh @PHHPA for reent reviewAF e ommon view in this deteD is tht while FFF fetterEdeveloped nnil systems positively inuene growthF st is reltively unimportnt for eonomi growth FF whether overll nnil development stems from nk or mrket development FFF4D @vevineD PHHPD pFRHHAF his onlusionD whih is referred to s the nnil servie view9 hs reeived empiril support from rossEsetion eonometri studies suh s fek nd vevine @PHHPA nd hemirguEuunt nd vevine @PHHIAF R gontrry to this viewD our model predits tht s long s nks nd mrket hve disE tint roles in the provision of informtion then the intertion etween them my hve n impt on growthF e nlyze the growth impt of the intertion etween stok mrket nd nks using the sme dt set s hemirguEuunt nd vevine @PHHIAF yur empiril ndings onrm the estlished result tht oth nking nd stok mrket development re positively ssoited with higher rel per pit growthF his positive reltionshipD howeverD hides some interesting intertion eets etween these two omponents of the nnil systemD whih hve not een fully explored in the empiril litertureF sn prE tiulrD y modifying the stndrd rossEountry growth regression model to inlude n intertion term etween nking nd stok mrket development we nd tht the growth impt of nking development is eted y the development of the stok mrketF peifE illyD our results show signint negtive intertion eet implying tht the impt of nking development on growth eomes less positive the higher is the level of stok mrket developmentF his is highly roust to lterntive speitions nd instrumenE 4 impiril nlyzes sed on pnel dt t industryElevel hllenge this empiril resultF por instneD desse @PHHPA nds tht in ountries with reltively underdeveloped nnil systemsD nk sed sysE tems seem to outperform mrket sed systemsF he opposite is lso trueD for ountries with reltively highly developed nnil systemsF tl vriles estimtionF his nding is onsistent with the model9s onlusion tht the intertion etween nk nd mrketEnne mtters for growthF he pper is orgnized s followsF etion P presents model where nkers perform only monitoringD while etion Q introdues sreeningF etion R nlyzes the implitions for long run eonomi growthF etion S presents the empiril evideneF e nl setion onludes the pperF 2 Market and bank-nance with monitoring he eonomy is populted y ontinuum of size N of identil entrepreneurs nd y ontinuum of size S of identil nnil investorsD with N > SF foth entrepreneurs nd nnil investors re riskEneutrlF pinnil investors re endowed with one unit of nnil welth eh nd n either nne entrepreneurs9 investment tivity or invest themselves in sfe sset tht yields return F intrepreneursD who hve no nnil welthD n operte t most one investment projet ehF wo types of investment projets re villeD G nd BD stisfying the following propertiesX iF e type G projet yields rte of return r with proility gD nd zero otherwiseD while ringing no privte enets to the entrepreneurY iiF e type B projet yields rte of return r with proility b nd zero otherwiseD nd ring B > H s privte enets to the entrepreneurY iiiF sndependently of its typeD eh projet needs one unit of nnil resoures @nnil pitlAF rving ssumed tht entrepreneurs hve no nnil resouresD tht is lso the mount of externl nnil resoures needed y eh entrepreneurY ivF b < g nd rb C B < < rgX only typeEG projets hve positive xet resent lue @xAF intrepreneurs9 individul hoie of projet9s type is privte informtionF sn other wordsD nnil investors nnot diretly oserve whether n individul entrepreneur hs hosen projet of type B or GF roweverD they n oserve suh hoie y inurring monitoring ost c per projetF pinnil investors hve three lterntive mens of investing their nnil resouresX a. feome market investors who purhse nnil seurities issued y entrepreneursY b. feome bankers who n quire privte informtion out the type of the nned investments through monitoringY c. snvest in the sfe sset tht yields F e dene banknance the nne provided y nkersD nd market-nance tht provided y mrket investorsF eordinglyD entrepreneurs9 pitl struture is dened in terms of the ompoE sition of nkEnneD lD nd mrketEnneD eD where for eh unit of nnil pitlD e C l a I holdsF S hile we ssume tht exEpost returns re perfetly oservleD monitoring is nonverE ile nd nonoservleF ine monitoring osts per unit of pitl re xedD for eh nkerD the inentive to monitor n entrepreneur will depend upon the ontriution mde y the nker to the nning needs of tht entrepreneurF S eordinglyD whether n enE trepreneur will e monitored or not n e perfetly inferred y oserving the pitl struture of the entrepreneur ndD in prtiulrD the mount of nkEnne provided y individul nkersF intrepreneurs9 informtion on soures of nning onstitutes privte informtionF roweverD entrepreneurs n redily dislose suh informtion if the nnil mrket is hrterized y dislosure lwF he ide is tht the dislosure lw ensures thtX F he informtion out the soures of nning reported y the entrepreneurs wishing to rise mrketEnne is truthfulY F intrepreneurs hve to report ll the relevnt informtionF pinnil mrkets where mrket nd nk nne re exhnged re ompetitiveF egents re prieEtkersD so tht they tke the returns per unit of nk nd mrket nne s givenF
2.1
Moral hazard and monitoring ine entrepreneurs hve no internl soures of nne nd no ollterl to k up externl nningD nnil investors strongly dislike nning projets of type BD whih yield negtive xF T xeverthelessD entrepreneurs might hve the inentive to hoose this type of projets euse of the ssoited privte enetsF eordinglyD there is potentil morl hzrd prolemF sf hoosing typeEf projetD the expeted prots of the entrepreneur re @r r wacc AbCBD while the expeted prots ssoited with typeEq projet re @r r wacc AgD where r wacc a r l l C r e e @IA is the weighted verge ost of unit of nnil pitl @wA fed y the entrepreneurD nd r l nd r e re the returns promised to nkers nd mrket investorsD respetivelyF qiven the expeted prots ssoited with the lterntive types of investmentD n entrepreneur hs strong inentive to hoose type B projets whenever @r r wacc Ab C B > @r r wacc Ag D r wacc > r B ¡ : @PA intrepreneurs prefer typeEG projets if the reverse inequlity holdsF e wnt morl hzrd to e pervsive mening tht in ny equiliriumD r wacc > r B=¡ holdsF eordinglyD we impose =g > r B=¡ whihD s shown lterD is suient ondition for tht to hppenF fy inurring monitoring ost c per projetD nkers oserve the type of projet hosen y entrepreneursD in whih se they n enfore the hoie of projets of type 5 his feture of the model is equivlent to tht put forwrd y rolmstrom nd irole @IWWUAF 6 ine rb C B < D of pool of nnil investors nning type B projetD t lest one of them must e reeiving n expeted return lower thn the opportunity ost of pitlD D in expeted termsF T G s ondition for supplying nneF e ssume tht returns re perfetly orrelted ross projetsF U eordinglyD given tht monitoring tivity is nonverileD nkers re themselves sujet to potentil morl hzrd prolemF his eomes speilly relevnt when n entrepreneur is nned oth y nkers nd mrket investorsF qiven the mount of nkEnne demnded y n entrepreneurD l Denition 1 An equilibrium with nancial exchange is a pair of returns (r £ l ; r £ e ) to be paid to bank and market nance respectively, such that:
i. Given returns, individual nancial investors and entrepreneurs take their nancial/investment decisions so as to maximize their expected payo;
ii. The aggregate demand and supply of market and bank nance are such that the markets for bank and market nance both clear.
sn order to hrterize the equiliriumD we nlyze the individul ehvior of nnil investors nd entrepreneurs nd derive the relted supply nd demnd shedules for mrket nd nk nneF e rst fous on nnil investorsF hen operting s nkersD nnil investors hoose whether to monitor nned investment or not so to mximize the net returnF gorrespondinglyD given the nkEnne demnded y eh entrepreneurD l d D nkers9 expeted return per unit of nkEnne net of osts is b a mx@gr l c l d ; br l A: @SA hen operting s mrket investorsD given the promised return per unit of mrketE nneD r e D their expeted return is E@r e AD where E@r e A equls gr e or br e depending on 7 ome degree of orreltion greter thn zero is needed to justify why nkers nnot redily ommit to monitor unless they re supplying enough funds to the entrepreneur sD with no orreltionD eh nker ould hieve full risk diversition y nning ontinuum of projets @see lso rolmstrom nd iroleD IWWUAF essuming perfet orreltion simplies the nlysisF en lterntive pproh ould e to ssume tht eh nker n monitor t most one projetF U whether the entrepreneurs issuing the relted nnil seurities re investing in projets of type G @VA yn the other hndD if the entrepreneur were hoosing type B projetD demnd for nne will e positive if r wacc r C B=b nd zero otherwiseF smportnt to the nlysis of the entrepreneuril hoie of nkEnne versus mrketE nne is the following Lemma 1 Moral hazard is pervasive: In any equilibrium with nancial exchange, entrepreneurs have a strong incentive to choose type B projects.
Proof. ee ppendixF he ft tht morl hzrd is pervsive mens thtD in the sene of the dislosure lwD in equiliriumD entrepreneurs nnot redily ommit to hoose type G projetsD even if they wnted toF o long s the hoie of projet9s type is privte informtionD entrepreneurs hve lwys the inentive to hoose type B projets even if they nnoune otherwiseF he V only wy investors n mke sure tht entrepreneurs hoose type G projets is to monitor themD in whih se the hoie of projets G n e enfored s ondition for otining nneF st follows from eqution @RA tht entrepreneurs will e sujet to monitoring if l d ! c=¡r l F reneD in the presene of the dislosure lw entrepreneurs n signl to mrket investor their hoie of type G projets y demnding @nd dislosingA n mount of nk nne l d ! c=¡r l F ine the dislosure lw ensures the truthfulness of the dislosed inforE mtionD the dislosed level of nkEnneD l d D is informtive of whether the entrepreneur is monitored or notF V e reson why n entrepreneur might hve n inentive to demnd l d ! c=¡r l is to gin ess to heper mrket nneF vet r e e the rte of return tht n entrepreneur dislosing n mount of mrket nne l d ! c=¡r l hs to gurntee to mrket investorsF henD entrepreneurs who demnd n mount of mrket nne lower thn c=¡r l would hve to gurntee return r e g=bD whih is stritly greter thn r e D sine g > bF his is se euse mrket investorsD on the sis of lemm ID orretly ntiipte tht suh entrepreneurs re not sujet to monitoring nd therefore will hoose type B projetsD whih hve proility of suess equl to bF gorrespondinglyD in the presene of the dislosure lwD given r l nd r e D r wacc a @IHA xote tht neessry ondition for entrepreneurs to demnd n mount of nkE nne lower thn c=¡r l is r l > r e g=bF sn this seD if hoosing l d < c=¡r l D the optiml strtegy would e to set l d a H nd use only mrketEnneF qiven @IHAD the demnd for mrketEnneD e d a I l d D diretly followsF pinllyD ggregte demnd of nkEnne is found y integrting l d over the intervl H; ND whih yields Nl d F gorrespondinglyD the ggregte demnd of mrketEnne is N@I l d AF he ove signling mehnism does not work in the sene of the dislosure lwF intrepreneurs who nnoune l d ! c=¡r l to get ess to heper mrket nne would lwys then hve the inentive to het y nning themselves just with mrketEnne 8 sn other wordsD the dislosure lw prevents entrepreneurs from misreporting informtion @hetingA on their soures of nningF reneD the informtion dislosed is redileD nd the level of nning eomes meningful ommitment devieF W @if ny mrketEnne is villeAD whih would lso enle them to hoose projets of type BD whih ording to vemm ID they stritly preferF sn other wordsD the dislosure of l d ! c=¡r l would not e redileD sine there is no lw to ensure the truthfulness of the dislosed informtion nd entrepreneurs hve the inentive to hetF st then follows thtD without the dislosure lwD the return @whih will e determined in equiliriumA tht n entrepreneur should gurntee to mrket investorsD r e D is independent of the mount of nkEnne demnded y tht entrepreneurF nder these irumstnesD entrepreneurs hoose to use just nkEnne @mrketEnneA so long s r l > @<Ar e nd will e indierent etween the two soures of nne if r l a r e F qiven the shedules of demnd nd supply of nneD Proof. ee ppendixF foth in the presene nd in the sene of the dislosure lwD the x generted through the investment tivity mde possile y nnil exhnge would e gr c per unit of nneF hether nnil exhnge tkes the form of oth nk nd mrket nne or nkEnne lone does not hve ny rel eetF pinnil struture is just veilX wht mtters is the presene of nnil system tht gurntees nnil exhngeY whether nkEnne domintes or nk nd mrket nne oexist does not mke ny diereneF xotlyD there is omplementrity reltionship running from nkEnne to mrketEnneX neessry ondition for the exhnge of mrketEnne is tht enE trepreneurs re monitored y nkersD whih in turn implies tht nkers re providing enough nne to hve the inentive to monitorF etD this omplementrity reltionship hs no onsequenes on the x of nned investmentsF 3 Market and bank-nance with monitoring and screening e now enrih our model y introduing new soure of informtionl imperfetionF e ssume tht projets of type G ome in two dierent qulitiesX G nd GF ulity G projets hve proility of suess g while qulity G hve proility of suess gD with g > gF W he qulity of type G projets nnot e oserved diretlyF reneD when 9 hether we ssume tht projets of qulity G hve positive x or not is irrelevntF IH operting projets of type GD entrepreneurs re not le to selet qulity GF roweverD y inurring xed ost sreening ost sD nkers n oserve suh qulityF e ssume thtD onditionl on hoosing projet of type GD the proility to selet qulity G is Y with proility I qulity G is seletedF eordinglyD g gC@I Ag is the ex nte expeted proility of suess of type G projet in the sene of sreeningF reeningD similrly to monitoringD is nonverileF ell other ssumptions re unE hngedF sn prtiulrD we mintin tht the entrepreneurs n redily dislose their soures of nning if they re sujet to the dislosure lwF @IPA e note tht sreening nd entrepreneur dds vlue if nd only if the entrepreneur is hoosing type G projetF hereforeD sine morl hzrd is pervsiveD sreening ould tke ple only if the nker is monitoringF reening tkes ple s followsF he entrepreneur smples projet of type GD nd the nker inurs ost s to oserve the qulity of suh investmentF sf the qulity is G the sreening proess termintesD otherwiseD the investment is disrded nd the entrepreneur will smple nother projetD nd the nker will sreen ginF ine the proility tht the entrepreneur smples qulity G is equl to D the expeted sreening ost per entrepreneur is equl to a s=F eordinglyD the overll expeted return for the nker when sreening is gr l l d c D while if the nker just monitorsD the expeted return would e gr l l d cF hereforeD the neessry nd suient ondition for nkers to sreen is r l l d ! ¡ min ; @IQA 10 es it emerges from the following disussionD nkers only selet qulity G when sreeningF inE trepreneurs run the investments tht the nkers re willing to nneY thereforeD when sujet to sreenE ingD they lern tht the qulity of the investment they re undertking is GF II where ¡ min a g gF sn order for the nker to hve the inentive to sreenD the overll promised pymentD r l l d D must e high enoughF hene b c¡ min =¡F sn ll the following nlysis we ssume > b D in order to llow for the possiility of monitoring without sreening to our in equiliriumF purthermoreD in order to fous only on equiliri where nnil exhnge tkes pleD we only onsider the se in whih r > @ C cA=gF 3.2 Equilibrium analysis henition I ppliesF pinnil investors9 ehvior is still desried y equtions @TA nd @UAD where now b a mx@gr l c l d ; gr l c C l d ; br l A @IRA to ount for the possiility tht nkers ould sreen the qulity of nned investment if they wishF elsoD note tht the expeted return to mrket nneD E@r e AD equls gr e if entrepreneurs issuing nnil seurities re sujet to sreeningF imilrlyD entrepreneurs9 demnd for nne is still desried y eqution @VAF woreE overD vemm I still pplies so thtD without dislosure lwD entrepreneurs nnot ommit to the hoie of projets of type GF II es eforeD it then follows thtD without dislosure lwD dislosing the mount of nkEnning does not serve s signl of whether n entrepreneur will e monitoredF hereforeD the rte of return to mrket nneD r e D does not depend on the entrepreneur9s hoie of pitl strutureF nder these irumstnesD entrepreneurs9 pitl struture deisions re s in the previous modelF hings re dierent in the presene of the dislosure lwD whih gurntees the truthE fulness of the dislosed informtionF fy demnding @nd dislosingA n mount of nk nneD l d D greter or equl to c=¡r l D entrepreneurs would redily signl tht they re sujet to monitoringF intrepreneurs might tully wnt to demnd more nkEnne thn c=¡r l to indue nkers to sreenF qiven eqution @IQAD for nker to e given the inentive to sreenD l d ! =¡ min r l must holdF fy dislosing suh n mount of nkE nne entrepreneurs would signl to the otherwise uninformed mrket investors tht their projet is sujet to sreeningF his would result in heper mrket nneF vet r e e the return tht n entrepreneur with l d ! =¡ min r l must gurntee to mrket investorsF henD r e g=g would e the return tht n entrepreneur with l d P c=¡r l ; =¡ min r l A should gurntee to mrket investorsD where g=g > IF his is the se euse mrket investors know tht entrepreneur will hoose type G projetD ut suh projet will not e sujet to sreening nd ordingly its proility of suess is g rther thn gF woreoverD s eforeD r e g=b is the return tht n entrepreneur with l d < c=¡r l should gurntee to mrket investorsF xote thtD > b implies c=¡r l < =¡ min r l F 11 pollowing the logis of the proof of lemm I it n e esily veried tht imposing =g > r B=¡ max is suient for entrepreneurs to hve strong inentive to hoose type B projets in ny equilirium with nnil exhngeF IP gorrespondinglyD the verge ost of pitl fed y n entrepreneur is @ITA xote thtD similrly to the previous modelD neessry ondition for entrepreneurs to demnd less nkEnne thn c=¡r l is r l < r e g=bF nder this senrioD when demnding less nkEnne thn c=¡r l D the optiml strtegy is to set l d a HF rving nlyzed individul ehviorD we now proeed to hrterize the equiliriumF sn prinipleD the equilirium n tke two formsX a. PoolingD with no sreeningD in whih se investment types G nd G re pooled together nd nned so tht the proility of suess of nned investments equls gD ndY b. SeparatingD in whih investments of type G re seprted from type G investments y mens of the sreening proessD nd only type G re nnedD so tht the proility of suess of nned projets is gF e nlyze rst the equilirium in the sene of dislosure lwF ithout dislosure lwD informtion on whether entrepreneurs re monitored nd their projets re sreened remins privteF eordinglyD Lemma 2 Given r > @ C cA=gA and r T a =¡ min , without the disclosure law the equilibrium is unique and characterized as follows:
i. The amount of nanced investment is S and bank-nance is the only form of nancing: l d£ a I; r £ l a r;
ii. The equilibrium involves pooling and no screening if r < =¡ min and separation through screening otherwise.
ProofF ee eppendixF reening is @stritlyA eient if nd only if the expeted produtivity gins it induesD ¡ min rD @stritlyA exeed the expeted sreening ostD D iFeF if nd only if r ! @>A=¡ min F sn the sene of dislosure lwD nkers re the only suppliers of nneF qiven N > SD r l a r holds nd nkers pproprite ll the surplus generted y entrepreneurs9 investments net of monitoring nd sreening ostsF nder these irumstnesD nkers IQ fully internlize the enets from sreeningD nd this is whyD s desried in vemm P they lwys undertke the eient level of sreeningF hierentlyD in the presene of the dislosure lwD mrket investors enet from sreenE ingD s sreening results in n inrese in the proility ssoited with the promised return r e D without inurring ny of the ostsF es we show nextD this turns out to hve ruil implitions with respet to the eieny of sreening in the previling equiliriumF 3.2.1 Pooling equilibrium sn pooling equiliriumD nks perform no sreeningD nd oth qulity G nd G projets re nnedD suh tht exEpostD frtion g of the investment projets is suessful nd the overll welfre gin generted y nnil exhnge is gr cF Lemma 3 The pooling equilibrium, if it exists, is unique and is characterized as follows: he ultimte ojetive of our nlysis is to determine whether the previling equilirium would involve the eient level of sreeningF es disussed erlierD sreening is eient if nd only if r > =¡ min F eordinglyD on the sis of lemmt @RA nd @TA we re le stte the following Proposition 2 Given r > @c C A=g and > b :
1. For r P ¡ min ; rA the pooling equilibrium is the unique equilibrium, while separation through screening would be ecient; 13 fy oserving the mount of nkEnneD l 00 D mrket investors who invest in nnil seurities know tht the entrepreneurs9 investments re not going to e sreenedF IS 2. For r P r; r pooling and screening equilibria coexist and screening is ecient; 3. For all other values of r there is a unique equilibrium. This involves separation through screening whenever screening is ecient(i.e. for r > r) and pooling otherwise (i.e. for r < =¡ min ).
ProofF ee eppendixF roposition P summrizes our resultsF por vlues of the sreening ost suiently highD iFeF > b D nd if the return to investment in the se of suess is not suiently high pooling equilirium where nkers undertke no sreening n previl even though sreening would ontriute positive x in expeted termsF henever this is the seD the introdution of nnil mrket hrterized y dislosure lw implies net llotive eieny loss s nkers loose the inentive to sreenF his would result in investment generting lower expeted net present vlue thn would hve een otherwiseF he possiility of the eonomy eing hrterized y n ineiently low level of sreening s onsequene of the development of mrketEnne following the introdution of the dislosure lwD stems from the ruil oservtion tht mrket investors enet from the gins from sreening without inurring ny of the ssoited ostsF 4 Financial structure and economic growth he ove results re inorported in simple yvq model to derive their implitions for the reltionship etween nnil struture nd growthF e onsider n eonomy populted y ontinuum of size N of two periods living identil entrepreneurs nd overlpping genertions of size S of twoEperiods living identil nnil investorsF ell gents re riskEneutrl nd derive utility from onsumption in their seond period of life onlyF pinnil investors re endowed with one unit of lor tht they supply to rms in exhnge for slry w t when youngF hey sve the resulting lor inome either y investing in sfe sset yielding return or y nning entrepreneurs9 tivityF intrepreneurs hve no endowment of lor nd re the only ones le to run rm produtionF IR ih entrepreneur n run t most one rmF pirms re ompetitive nd produe ording to Y t a v K t N I t A t D where Y t is output per rmD K t is pitl per rmD N t is lor perErmD nd re prmeters greter thn zeroD v is rndom vrile tht tkes vlue I in the se of suess nd H in the se of filureD nd A t is lerning y doing externlityD with A t a k t D where k t a K t =N t F pull pitl depreition is ssumedD so tht investment t time t equls next period pitlD K tCI F he proility of suess t time t C I depends on the qulity of the investment in physil pitlD K tCI D undertken t time tF 14 xote tht the ssumption tht entrepreneurs hve no endowments is mde only to simplify the expositionF IT ih rm is operted y n entrepreneurF intrepreneurs hve the sme role of enE trepreneurs in the models desried in the previous setionX they deide whether to unE dertke projet of type G or type BD where projet is now of vrile sizeF sf the rm investment in physil pitl is of type iD where i a G; B the proility of suess is j a g; bF woreoverD following previous nlysisD type G investments re either of qulity G or qulity GF sn the rst seD the proility of suess is gD while in the seond se it would e gD where we mintin g > gF es eforeD g a g C @I Ag represents the expeted vlue of the proility of type G investment of unknown qulityF es in the previous nlysisD entrepreneurs9 hoie of projets9 type is privte informE tionF pinnil investors n oserve it y inurring monitoring ost c per unit of pitlD so tht the totl ost of monitoring rm investing n mount K tCI is cK tCI F woreoverD equivlently to setion QD entrepreneurs do not know the qulity of type G projetsF piE nnil investors n oserve suh qulity y inurring sreening ost K tCI D where we rell tht is the expeted sreening ost per unit of investmentF pinllyD oth sreening nd monitoring osts re mesured in terms of forgone return to pitlF @PTA sn equilirium A t a k I t D whih implies r t a nd w t a @I A k t @ondition iiiAF xote thtD t ny time tD the frtion of suessful rms is iD where i a g if rms9 investment is not sujet to sreeningD nd i a g otherwiseD so tht the mss of suessful rms is iNF ine totl lor supply is SD S=Ni is the mount of lor per rmF hereforeD k t a K t Ni=SF pinllyD ondition v sttes tht in equilirium the mrkets for nk nd mrket nne s well s the mrket for lor should lerF qiven r tCI D individul nnil deisions of oth nnil investors nd entrepreneurs re extly the sme s in the model with unit size investmentD so tht the nlysis of seE tion QFP ppliesF he only notle dierene onerns the ggregte demnd for nnil IV resouresD whih in equilirium tends to innityD rther thn to ND when r wacc;tCI < r tCI D nd orrespondinglyD it is innitely elsti etween H nd I rther thn etween H nd N for r wacc;tCI F tillD equilirium demnd is H for r tCI > r wacc;tCI F rving nlyzed individul ehviorD we riey disuss the equilirium with nnil exhnge nd hrterize its properties in the sene nd presene of the dislosure lw on the sis of the results formlly derived in setions P nd QF pirst of llD we oserve tht s in the model with unit size investmentD for n equilirium with nnil exhnge to existD the equilirium return to pitl in se of nnil exhngeD D must exeed @ C cA=gF IS purthermoreD sine the demnd for nnil resoures tends to I for r wacc;tCI < r tCI D in ny equilirium with nnil exhnge r wacc;tCI a r tCI X nnil investors still pproprite ll the return to pitlF sn the sene of the dislosure lwD vemm P ppliesX nkEnne is the only soure of nne nd sreening still ours if nd only if r t > =¡ min iFeF if nd only if > =¡ min D where we re imposing the equilirium vlue of r t a F pollowing the denition of mroeonomi equiliriumD in the sene of sreeningD w t a @I Ag k t D with k t a K t gN=SF gorrespondinglyD given K tCI a Sw t =ND ggregte produt t time t CID gross of monitoring ostsD is NgY t @I AF wonitoring osts re mesured in units of forgone return to pitlF eordinglyD ggregte monitoring osts mount to c@I AY t NgF hereforeD when sreening does not tke pleD the growth rte of the eonomy is Growth M t a @g cA@I A I: @PUA xoting tht in the presene of sreening gN rms re suessful in eh periodD y pplying the ove proedure the growth rte in the se of sreening is found to e Growth S t a @g c A@I A I: @PVA gomprison of equtions @PUA nd @PVA suggests tht sreening results in higher growth rte whenever ! =¡ min F etD s disussed oveD sreening tkes ple if nd only if ! =¡ min F es < I holdsD this implies the possiility tht even when nkers re the only providers of nneD the level of sreening n e ineiently lowF his eetD whih is novel with respet to the model with unit investment nd no growthD is due to the ft tht dierently from tht modelD even when the nkers re the only suppliers of nneD they do not pproprite the overll return tht physil investment genertesY prt of it is in ft pproprite y workersD who provide the other input neessry for produtionD nmely lorF es for the equilirium in the presene of dislosure lwD the results derived in the model with unit size investment presented in vemmt QET holdF reneD the previling equilirium is s desried in proposition PD where r is now to e repled y r t D with r t a ording to denition PF hereforeD we derive the following 15 sf notD nnil investors would prefer to invest in the sfe ssetD whih will led to n equilirium with no produtionF IW Proposition 3 The development of market-nance following the introduction of the disclosure law has ambiguous eects on economic growth:
i. For P @ ¡ min ; r) the eect is negative;
ii. For P r; r there eect is either nil or negative;
iii. For all other values of the eect is nil.
he ove proposition follows diretly from roposition PD where r is eing repled y nd thus it does not require forml proofF vet us onsider n eonomy without dislosure lwX ssuming ! =¡ min D nkersD who re the only providers of nneD perform sreening whih results in mximum growth t the vlue given y eqution @PVAF essume the dislosure lw is introduedF henD in the resulting equiliriumD externl nne will e provided oth y nkers nd mrket investorsF sn se @iAD the return to pitl is so low tht the resulting equilirium will not involve sreeningD nd the growth rte would e given y eqution @PUAF his holds even when sreening would led to higher growth rteD whih hppens if the return to pitl exeeds =¡ min F sn this seD the development of mrketEnneD y inhiiting the sreening role of nkersD hs negtive n dverse eet on growth F por intermedite vlues of the return to pitlD se @iiAD the equilirium outome in terms of level of sreening is unertinD the nnil setor n end up either pooling or in sreening equiliriumF sn the rst instneD provided tht > =¡ min D the development of mrketEnne would hve n dverse eet on growthD while in the seond instne it would hve noneF pinllyD for high vlues of the return to pitlD se @iiiAD the development of mrketE nne hs no onsequenes on the level of sreening undertken y nkersF eordinglyD there re no onsequenes for eonomi growthF 5 Empirical Method, Data and Results yur nlysis implies thtD other things eing equlD the shift from system in whih there is only nkEnne to system in whih nkEnne nd mrketEnne oEexist inuenes the growth proessF he development of mrketEnne spurred y the introE dution of dislosure lw regrding the soures of nning of entrepreneurs might et negtively the growth proess y inuening the sreening tivity performed y nkersF sn this setionD we test the presene of suh intertion using stndrd rossEsetion growth model nd using hemirguEuunt nd vevine @PHHIA dtsetD the sis on whih the nnil servies view9 reeives its empiril supportF sn order to ssess the growth impt of the intertion etween nk nd mrket nneD we would idelly like to hve rod mesure of these types of nneF roweverD due to dt limittionsD it is not fesile to onstrut for lrge list of ountries rod PH inditor of mrketEnne whih enompsses ll types of nnil mrketsF pollowing the empiril litertureD we rely on stok mrket development inditors to proxy for the importne of mrketEnneF sn our modelD entrepreneurs wishing to rise mrket nne must omply with dislosure lwF imilrlyD efore ompny is le to rise nne in the stok mrketD it hs to meet some listing requirements nd dislose informtion to mrket prtiipnts ording to some speied lwsF o guge the importne of nkEnneD we rely on trditionl nking development inditors whih mesure the size of nking redit to qhF husD to test the implition of the model tht the intertion etween the vrious omponents of the nnil systems my mtter for growthD we exmine whether the intertion etween nk nd stok mrket development hs signint impt on longErun growthF e estimte rossEsetion growth model similr to tht of uing nd vevine @IWWQA nd frro nd lEiEwrtin @IWWPAF he rel growth of per pit inome is regressed on vetor of ountry ontrolsD mesures of nking nd stok mrket developmentD nd n dditionl intertion term etween the ltter two vrilesF husD we modify the stndrd growth regression s follows Growth i a a H C X i i Country i C I Bank i C P T or i C Q Interact C e i ; @PWA where Growth is the longErun growth rte of rel per pit qh verged over IWVHEIWWSY Bank is the level of nking development mesured y the lims on privte setor y deposit money nks s shre of qh over IWVHEIWWSY Tor is the stok mrket turnover rtio mesured over IWVHEIWWSY Interact is n intertive term etween Bank nd TorD nd Country is vetor of ountry ontrols usully used in rossEsetion regressions to ontrol for other potentil determinnts of rossEountry growth rtes @see for instne frro nd lEiEwrtinD IWWPY fek nd vevine @PHHPAAF sn the se regressionD we inlude initil inome per pit mesured y the logrithm of rel qh per pit in IWVH to ontrol for the onvergene eetF por roustnessD the list of ountry ontrol is lter widened to inlude initil humn pitl mesured y the verge shool yers in the popultion over PS in IWVHY n inditor of government size mesured y government expenditure s shre of qhY the intion rte lulted s log dierene of gs vergedY trde openness mesured y rel exports nd imports s shre of rel qh nd the lk mrket is mesured y the lk mrket premiumF ell these vriles @exept for initil humn pitlA re verges over the period IWVHEIWWSF e use hemirguEuunt nd vevine @PHHIA dtsetD IT whih overs more thn IHH ountries over the period IWVHEIWWSF he use of this dtset genertes t lest two min enetsF pirstD it llows us to ompre our results with existing studies deling with the issue of nnil struture nd eonomi growthD most of whih mke use of this dtsetF 16 por detiled desription of the dtsetD denitions nd souresD see hemirguEuunt nd vevine @PHHIAF PI eondD the list of vriles inluded is quite omprehensive llowing us to onstrut lrge numer of instruments to test for the endogeneity of BankD Tor nd Interact nd rry the pproprite tests on suitility of these instrumentsF he intertion term used in the empiril model is n intertion etween two ontinE uous vrilesF ht the intertion term signies in eqution @IA requires some further explntion s this type of intertion is not widely used in the literture @gohen et lFD PHHQD trd nd urrisiD PHHQAF qiven interact a Bank ¢Tor the regression model @PWA n e written sX Growth a a H C @ I C Q T orABank C P T or C e @QHA or Growth a a H C @ P C Q bankAT or C I Bank C e; @QIA where we neglet the vetor of ontrols for simpliityF sn eqution @PWA the estimted oeients on Bank nd Tor reet onditionl relE tionshipsF sn other wordsD I mesures the eet of Bank on Growth when Tor is zeroD while P mesures the eet of Tor on Growth when Bank is zeroF iets n e mde more interpretle y entering vriles round the menF eordinglyD I would meE sure the eet of Bank on Growth when Tor tkes men vlueD while P would mesure the eet of Tor on Growth when Bank tkes men vlueF eording to equtions @QHA nd @QIAD the totl eet of Bank or Tor on Growth depends on the estimted oeient of the intertion termF por instneD in eqution @QIAD negtive vlue for the eet of the intertion term indites tht the higher the level of stok mrket development mesured y it turnover rtioD the lower @or less positiveA is the eet of nking development on growthF elso note tht the slope of the regression of Growth on Bank @usully known s the simple slopeA depends upon the prtiulr vlue tht Tor tkesF his llows us to interpret the results in more informtive wyF peillyD we n hoose grid of vlues of TorD sustitute them into the estimted eqution nd generte the orrespondent series of simple slopes of Growth on Bank t dierent vlues of TorF his llows us to explore the eet of nking development on growth t dierent levels of stok mrket developmentF IU esting whether the simple slopes of the regression of qrowth on fnk re dierent t dierent vlues of or is identil to the tEtest used for the signine of oeient of Q in the overll regression @gohen et lFD PHHQAF IV 17 o test whether the slope of the regression t dierent vlues of or is signintD we use the vlues from the vrine ovrine mtrix of the regression oeientsF peillyD the stndrd error of the regression oeient for Bank is given y S 1 a p s 11 C PTors 13 C T or 2 s 33 where s 11 nd s 33 re the vrines of Bank nd Interact respetively nd s 13 is ovrine etween Bank nd Interact ll tken from the smple estimte of the vrine ovrine mtrixF he test of the simple slope is tEtest with t equl to the simple slope divided y its stndrd errorD with N k I degrees of freedomD where N is the smple size nd k is the numer of independent vriles inluding the intertion termF 18 por instneD onsider two vlue of T orD ll them T or H nd T or L F he simple slopes in question will PP 5.1
Empirical results golumns I nd P in le I report the results of the se yv regression with nd withE out entering the vrilesF he overll regression results suggest tht highly developed ountries tend to grow slower implying onvergene eetY tht higher level of nking development is ssoited with higher per pit growth rtesY nd tht higher turnover rtio of stok mrkets re ssoited with higher per pit growth rtesF snterestinglyD the oeient on the intertive term @ Q A is negtive nd highly signint inditing the existene of intertion eet etween stok mrket nd nking developmentF peifE illyD the signint negtive oeient on the term Interact implies tht the higher the level of stok mrket developmentD the lower @or less positiveA is the eet of nking development on growthF imilrlyD it lso indites tht the higher the level of nking developmentD the lower @the less positiveA is the eet of stok mrket on growthF he ft tht the estimted vlue of Q is signintly dierent from zero might e reeting nonElinerity in the nneEgrowth reltionshipD rther thn n intertion eetF foth nking depth nd stok mrket development re lrgely driven y set of other vriles nd re lso highly orrelted ross ountriesF sf there is diminishing growth returns to nnil development generllyD then ny seond order term inluding the intertion term will hve negtive oeientF o ount for this possiilityD we inlude in golumn QD the regression results with the other seondEorder terms @Bank P nd T or P AF roweverD s n e seen from le ID the intertion term retins its high signine while oth Bank P nd T or P re not signint t the onventionl levelsF o explore further the impt of the intertion eetD pigure P plots the growth impt of nking depth ginst the level of stok mrket development sed on the results of golumn P in le IF es n e seen from this gureD s the level of Tor PQ shoolingF es n e seen from the tleD the estimted oeients on Bank nd Tor re positive nd signint while the estimted oeient on intertive term is negtive nd retins its signine t the I7 levelF he only minor dierene from the previous result is tht the estimted oeient on nking development dereses in sizeD ut is still signint t the IH7 levelF sn ddition to OLSD we use instrumentl vriles @IV A estimtion to ontrol for potentil simultneity is nd reverse uslity from growth rtes to nk nd stok mrket developmentF he following set of instruments is used to extrt the exogenous omponent of nking nd stok developmentF pirstD we use the legl origin of eh ountry @prenhD inglishD qermn or ndinvinA s instrumentsF vegl origins n explin dierenes in legl odes nd the eieny in whih lws re enforedF eondD we use reditor rights index whih mesures the degree of tht legl odes support seured reditors in se of reorgniztion or liquidtion of ompnyF hirdD we use shreholder rights index whih mesures the degree of support the legl system provides for minority shreholders ginst mngers or dominnt shreholdersF pourthD we inlude instruments tht mesure the qulity of ountry9s ounting stndrdsF es rgued y v ort et lF @IWWVAD ounting ply n importnt role in orporte governneD in estlishing ontrts etween mngers nd investorsD nd interpreting ompny dislosuresF pinllyD we use the lw of lw whih is mesure of the lw nd order trdition of ountry nd the eieny nd qulity of enforement of investors9 rightsF PH v ort et lF @IWWVA rgue tht the legl origins nd legl odes supporting reditors nd shreholders were determined enturies erlier nd hene n e treted s exogenously for the purpose of this nlysisF e report the rnsen test for overEidentifying restritions @hvidson nd wuinnonD IWWQY fumD herD nd tillmnD PHHPAF he rnsen test of overEidentifying restriE tions tests the vlidity of the instruments usedF he hypothesis eing tested is tht the instruments used re unorrelted to the residulsF sf we re unle to rejet the null hypothesisD then the instruments used re ppropriteF es n e seen from golumn f le PD the results re roust to the use of s tehniqueF fnking nd stok mrket deE velopment enter with signint positive oeients wheres the estimted oeient on the intertive term is negtive nd highly signintF yne min dierene is tht the size of estimted oeients is muh lrger thn in previous regressionsF his result however my e driven y the lrge redution in the smple size from UI to RR oservtions nd the dominne of high inome ountries with etter dt vilility in the smpleF reneD the s results should e treted with utionF es to the vlidity of the instrumentsD the rnsen test is unle to rejet the null hypothesis inditing tht the instruments used re vlid iFeF they re not orrelted with the error termF sn golumn g le QD we use the s with the full onditioning set of ountry ontrolsF he results do not hnge muhD 20 por detiled desription of eh of these instruments see v ort et lF @IWWVAF PR exept tht the size on the estimted oeients on BankD Tor nd Interact derese in sizeF 6 Conclusion elthough the growthEnne nexus hs een hevily reserhed oth t the theoretil nd empiril levelD the study of the reltionship etween nnil struture nd long run eonomi growth hs so fr reeived muh less ttentionF his pper nlyzes the intertion etween mrket nd nkEnne in the ontext of model hrterized y morl hzrd nd imperfet informtion out the qulity of investmentF e show tht the estlishment of nnil mrket where entrepreneurs wishing to rise nne re sujet to dislosure lw regrding their pitl struture might undermine nnil institutions9 inentive to sreenD even when sreen would hve een eientF sing this result we lso show tht the hnge from nkEsed nnil system to system in whih mrketEnne nd nkEnne oexist my impt upon longErun growthF his is ontrry to the view whih lims tht higher nnil developmentD regrdless of its soureD is lwys eneil for eonomi growthF sing hemirguEuunt nd vevine @PHHIA rossEountry dtset nd modifying the stnE drd growth regression to inlude n intertion etween stok mrket nd nk develE opmentD we nd evidene whih is onsistent with our modelF peillyD we nd signint strongly negtive intertion eet implying tht t higher levels of stok mrE ket developmentD the ontriution of nk development to long run growth eomes less positiveF hese results oer new perspetive on the nnil struture nd growth9 deE teF hey lso hve importnt poliy implitionsD espeilly for developing nd emergE ing ountries whih in the lst two dedes with vrying degrees of suess hve imed t introduing ndGor reforming their stok mrketsF sf ompetition from stok mrket unE dermines the role of nk nd leds to disintermeditionD then eorts direted estlishing stokEmrket nk sed system my not hieve its intended ojetivesF reteroskedstiityEonsistent stndrd errors re reported in prenthesesF fold pigures inE dite signine of IH7 or lessF xyf is the numer of oservtionsF b he dependent vrile is the growth rte of rel per pit qh verged over IWVHEIWWSF sx is the intereptF vsxssev is the logrithm of initil inome per pit in IWVHF fexu is mesured y the rtio of lims on the privte setor y deposit money nks s shre of qh verged over IWVHEIWWSF y is turnover rtio mesured y totl vlue trded to stok mrket pitliztion verged over IWVHEIWWSF sxieg is n intertion term etween y nd fexuF he following list of ountry ontrols is inludedX ehi is n inditor trde openness mesured y rel export nd imports s shre of rel qh verged over IWVHEIWWSY qy is inditor of government size mesured y government expenditure s shre of qh verged over IWVHEIWWSY sxp is the intion rte lulted s the log dierene of qh detor verged over IWVHEIWWSY fw is lk mrket premium verged over IWVHEIWWPY hooling is n inditor of humn pitl mesured y verge shooling yers over PS in IWVHF he soure for ll these dt is hemirguEuunt nd vevine @PHHIAF c he instruments used re the rule of lwD shreholder rightsD reditor rightsD ounting stndrds mesured y n index nd the legl origin of ountryF he test of overEidentifying restritions sttisti is used to test the null tht the instruments re not orrelted with the error term nd hene re vlidF he sttisti is distriuted s hiEsquredF 
